The Carrot and Stick Effect of Law Enforcement on the Inducement of Trust in the Markets by 加藤,達彦 & Tatsuhiko,Kato
1. Introduction
In Japan the internal control transparency has been finally recognized as important
due to the enforcement of Japanese versioned SOX act (Financial Instruments Trading Act
and Company Act). The law enforcer urges the impeccable building of internal control
(IC) not only in the public companies but also in the private, thus, less important compa-
nies by the end of March 2008. The Japanese accounting firms are preparing for the inter-
nal control audit from the beginning of April 2008.
Taking into account this evolution, an experimental investigations is made so as to
examine whether making transparent an investment in the IC can reveal an honest man-
ager. The investment works in two ways. It can make his asset quality more likely to be
what he intends to achieve. With the internal control effectively functioned, the audit that
he has purchased can be more accurate. Another experimental investigation is conducted
in order to measure the carrot and stick effect of law enforcement on the inducement of
trust in the markets.
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The carrot is regarded as an extra bonus offered to a manager by the investor for his
successful investment, while the stick is meant to be penalties imposed by the law enforcer
on the manager against the investor’s loss. There seem to be 2 different types of penalties
enforcement; that of judges and that of regulators. As Glaeser et al. (2001) suggeste1, one
difference between judges and regulators might be the greater specialization of the latter,
leading to more efficient law enforcement.
This is particularly true in Japan, since a law suit could be considered to be time con-
suming and expensive, culturally rebuffed by the Japanese. Another contribution of this
investigation is to measure the effect of carrot; efficiency of rewards for good conduct
offered by the beneficiary, contrasted with penalties-orientated law enforcement.
These 2 investigations are based on our signaling model, in which both the investment
in the IC and the audit purchase can work as a signal for manager’s honesty. In the former
investigation 3 laboratory markets are created. In the first market auditing is unavailable
and in others a manager can purchase voluntarily an audit. He can invest in the IC
throughout 3 markets; while the investment is private in the first 2 markets, it is public in
the last. This setting simulates the introduction of internal control audit in Japan so as to
evaluate the impact of new rule.
In the latter investigation 3 laboratory markets are also created. Throughout 3 mar-
kets auditing is available and a manager can invest in the IC as well as the investment is
always public. In the first market the investor can sue the manager for his loss, whereas
in the second market sanctions are likely to be imposed by regulators on manager’s cheat-
ing.
One difference is that though the first market sometimes penalizes manager’s honesty,
the second will never do it. In the case of law suit judges are supposed to find with diffi-
culty any proof of manager’s cheating. On the other hand, regulators can correctly guess
his cheating but cannot always detect it.
Another difference is whether the investor’s loss is made up for or not. In the former
market the manager should compensate him for all his loss that he has suffered, every time
he wins the law suit, whereas in the latter he can never get it back. Finally in the last
market the manager is rewarded with an extra bonus for his investment in the IC and audit
purchase, whenever the investor has gains. The cost of investment in the IC is compen-
sated by the investor.
We obtain the following results in the first investigation. The investment in the IC
increases significantly when auditing is available and increases further once it has been
public, but not as much as in our previous research (Kato 2007 a), which shows a spectacu-
lar increase. However, as far as the economic efficiency, namely, frequency of honesty and
that of asset purchase is concerned, the results contrast sharply. Making public the invest-
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1 Glaeser et al. (2001), p. 863.
ment in the IC improves much the economic efficiency, which results support this invest-
ment as a signal for manager’s honesty.
The second investigation yields the following results. The economic efficiency, fre-
quency of honesty in particular, is the highest in the market with a law suit available.
Sanctions imposed by regulators are, although more precise, less efficient than as we ex-
pected. They couldn’t impose a sufficient threat on manager’s cheating, since they happen
apparently much fewer than law suits. They seem to be a bit slow to activate. As our
previous research (2007a) shows, sanctions imposed by regulators could work, only if
combined with a law suit.
Furthermore, the carrot doesn’t work, even if the investment in the IC increases to
some degrees compared with other markets. A little extra bonus given by the investor
can’t prevent managers from being attracted to a much bigger bonanza by cheating. Like
Fehr and Fishbacher (2003), who shows the necessity of sanctions against norm violations
for the inducement of reciprocity, these disappointing results demonstrate an overwhelm-
ing support for the superior effect of stick on good conduct so far.
Similar experimental research is done by Dejong et al. (1985), Dopuch et al. (1989),
Kachelmeier (1991), Dopuch and King (1992), and Wallin (1992). The more complicated
studies, whose objective is mainly the auditors reporting behavior, are done by Mayhew et
al. (2001) and Mayhew and Pike (2004). The effect of internal control transparency on the
inducement of trust in the markets is not examined by previous research, except for Kato
(2007a). Moreover, the carrot and stick effect of law enforcement on the inducement of
trust in the markets has never been considered.
The rest of our paper is organized as follows. We present a basic model in the section
2 and show the experimental design and results in the section 3. A summary and conclu-
sion are provided in the final section.
2. The Model
21 The Disclosure Game
We formulate a very simple disclosure model based on the prisoner’s dilemma game2.
First we ignore the investment in the IC so as to make our basic setting clearer. Suppose
that a manager sells an asset to an investor. The manager can make an effort or no effort.
Whenever he makes an effort, he incurs the cost , but he can certainly sell a high
quality asset. On the other hand, if he makes no effort, he incurs no cost at all, but he will
surely sell a low quality asset.
The investor can buy this asset or boycott it. If he would like to buy it, he should
always pay to the manager. The liquidation value of asset will amount to 15, if
3( 319 )
2 Strictly speaking, it is based on what Rasmusen (2006, pp. 136137) called a one-sided prisoner’s
dilemma.
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the quality is high. That value will be only 5, if the quality is low. Thereby the investor
can get 15－10＝5 in the former, while he will lose 5 (5－10＝－5) in the latter. The manag-
ers who make an effort can get only 10－5＝5, while those who make no effort can get
10－0＝10.
Let us assume that the manager always discloses that the asset quality is high, since
disclosing low leads to a boycott from the investor and hence meaningless. According to
this setting, anyone who is reluctant to make an effort will be regarded as a cheating
manager. He knows the real quality but the investor doesn’t. There exists an information
asymmetry. The rational choice of the investor is to boycott it, given the probability that
he buys a low quality asset only to lose 5 as a sucker’s payoff. Any manager willing to
make an effort knows that he will lose 5 due to the boycott of investor. The reasonable
solution is that he makes no effort at all. We are now facing with what Akerlof (1970)
called a lemon problem. Figure 1 sums it up.
22 The Signaling Game with a Basic Setting
The audit purchase and the investment in the IC can transmit information from a
manager to investors and solve the information asymmetry. We don’t need to explore
a new model, because the small modifications of our signaling game (Kato 2004・2005・
2006・2007b) are enough to explain the circumstances. The audit fee is denoted by .
As our previous models, 2 parameters (and) are provided. The former denotes how
often his or her intention, whether good or bad, will be fruitful. The latter indicates how
often a correct report will be provided on the audit purchase. These parameters are mean-
ingful, only if＞1/2 and＞1/2 for the time being at least, otherwise all the players would
defect. The major changes are simply the way they work.
The investment in the IC ameliorates them. In other word, it makes the asset quality
more likely to be high, as far as he makes an effort, while it makes the quality more likely
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Investor
Invest Not Invest
Cooperate Defect
Manager
High Quality Cooperate 5 5 －5 0
Low Quality Defect 10 －5 0 0
Figure 1 Disclosure Game
to be low, once he decided not to make an effort3. Even if he is completely effort-averse, he
is more likely to be mistaken for the honest type, as far as stays low. His desire to take
advantage of it pushes him into not investing in the IC. Thereby, the investment in the IC
might reveal the manager’s type. However, our assumption is that the simple investment
in the IC could not work as a signal for manager’s honesty. It is the audit purchase that
makes signaling feasible.
The cost of investment in the IC implies the increase of signaling cost incurred to
the manager, which increase can improves and produce a higher accuracy audit, as
if a more costly audit was purchased. The investment in the IC augments the accuracy in
exactly the same manner as the purchase of a more costly audit does. However, the signal-
ing effect of the investment is not expected, as long as it is private. The introduction of
internal control audit can make the investment public and will work out this problem,
since the fact of paying the cost is showing off.
23 The Signaling Game with a Law Suit Available
Both auditing and investment in the IC are available to the manager. There are two
types of managers: cheating and opportunistic. The cheating type is completely effort-
averse and never makes an effort. The opportunistic type trades-off the current benefit
from making no effort and the loss in reputation. In other words, he is willing to make an
effort, only if he is better off. An incorrect audit report is assumed to be provided, only if
the asset quality is actually low. It means no mistake made in the report when the asset
quality is high.
We define both pooling and separating equilibria in the following ways. The former
means that the opportunistic type will abandon his cheating, in other words, he will be
better off when he makes an effort. The latter indicates that the cheating or completely
effort-averse type abandon the investment in the IC and audit purchase because of his
negative payoff, thereby those who invest in the IC and purchase an audit have already
made an effort for certainty. As Figure 2 shows, the pale color areas indicate the pooling
regions, while the deep color areas imply the separating regions.
One type of penalties enforcement is that of judges. Investors can sue the manager for
their loss. However, they will never win, if the manager doesn’t purchase an audit or the
audit report says that the asset quality is low. All the losses they have suffered will be
reimbursed, if they win, but judges can find with difficulty any proof that the manager has
made no effort. The probability of winning a suit is denoted by and it doesn’t differ,
whether the manager makes an effort or not. If investors win, the manager should pay the
5( 321 )
3 Once the business goes wrong, managers cannot afford to take advantage of an unexpected
chance due to the inflexible nature of IC such as red tapes, which makes it difficult to deal with
rapidly evolved information technologies, This is one of the much criticized elements of the
institutionalization of internal control transparency.
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cost of law suit as well, otherwise they would owe it entirely to themselves. Higher
implies also a cultural or economic burden facing with the law suit.
As Figure 3 shows, the pale color areas indicate the pooling regions, while the deep
color areas imply the separating regions, given I＝0.5, C＝0.5, F＝3, and ＝1/24. The pool-
ing regions are independent of the signaling cost, say, total cost of investment in the IC
and audit purchase . Compared with Figure 2, much smaller (＝0.167 in the
pooling equilibrium and ＝0.833 in the separating equilibrium) can make the pooling and
separating equilibrium effective, as approaches 1.
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Figure 2 Pooling and Separating Regions with a Basic Setting
[Total Cost of Investment in the IC and Audit Purchase )
Figure 3 Pooling and Separating Regions with a Law Suit Available
[Total Cost of Investment in the IC and Audit Purchase , , and ]
4 See Kato (2006, p. 26).
24 The Signaling Game with Sanctions Imposed
Another type of penalties enforcement is that of regulators. They are likely to impose
penalties on manager’s cheating, which penalties would be enforced, only if the man-
ager made no effort and purchased an audit as well as the investors ended up losing the
investment. The probability of penalties imposed is denoted by , since cheating should
not always be detected. The expected payoff of cheating or completely effort-averse type,
decreases by


on the investment in the IC and audit purchase, compared with the
signaling game with a basic setting. Thus, we have the condition of a pooling [1] and
separating [2] equilibrium as follows.
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As Figure 4 shows, the pale color areas indicate the pooling regions, while the deep
color areas imply the separating regions, given I＝0.5, C＝0.5,＝1/2, and P＝8. This demon-
strates that even if almost no accuracy (＝0.00625) of audit, the pooling equilibrium can
hold, as approaches 1. Meanwhile, it shows much wider areas of separating regions.
25 The Signaling Game with an Extra Bonus Offered
The carrot is an extra bonus offered to a manager by the investor, if his investment
turns out to be successful. It will be offered, only if the manager invests in the IC and
purchases an audit. The expected payoff of honesty increases by, while that of cheating
increases by , where the bonus offered is denoted by . Thus, we have the condi-
tion of a pooling [1] and separating [2] equilibrium as follows.
As Figure 5 shows, the pale color areas indicate the pooling regions, while the deep
color areas imply the separating regions, given I＝0.5, C＝0.5, x＝0.5. Compared with Figure
2, a bit wider pooling regions are allowed, whereas the separating regions diminish a little,
since the cheating or completely effort-averse type can benefit from the bonus, too.
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Figure 5 Pooling and Separating Regions with an Extra Bonus Offered
[Total Cost of Investment in the IC and Audit Purchase , Extra Bonus＝0.5]
3. The Experimental Investigation
31 The Experimental Design
The examination is also made in a laboratory setting. The experimental design and
examination are made according to our disclosure and signaling games. The subjects are
9 undergraduate and 2 graduate students in Japan. By using computer terminals, we con-
duct a matching game played by a pair of subjects: a manager and an investor. However,
throughout the experimentation we are using the words “seller” and “buyer” instead of
“manager” and “investor” in order to be less idiosyncratic.
2 separate investigations are conducted. In the first investigation 3 laboratory markets
are created. In the first market (market 1) auditing is unavailable and in the second (mar-
ket 2) and third (market 3) markets a manager can purchase voluntarily an audit. He can
invest in the IC throughout 3 markets; while the investment is unobservable to an investor
in the first 2 markets, it is observable in the last.
In the second investigation 3 laboratory markets are also created. Throughout 3 mar-
kets auditing is available and a manager can invest in the IC as well as the investment is
always public. In the first market (market 4) the investor can sue the manager for his loss,
whereas in the second (market 5) sanctions are likely to be imposed by regulators on
manager’s cheating. In the third market (market 6) the manager is rewarded with an extra
bonus for his investment in the IC and audit purchase, whenever the investor’s asset pur-
chase turns out to be profitable. The cost of investment in the IC is compensated by the
investor.
In each investigation the subjects experience all the markets from the first to third and
are told the experiment would last 20 periods. We illustrate the common part of sequence
of actions in the 2 investigations. The treatment follows the sequence outlined here for
each period.
( 1 ) Each manager can invest in the IC. The cost is 0.5 yen. Whether he did so or not
is announced. The investment can improve .
( 2 ) The manager can make an effort so as to increase the probability of reaching the
high asset quality, but he doesn’t know exactly which quality (low or high) he
has achieved. He incurs 5 yen by making an effort.
( 3 ) The asset quality is disclosed high.
( 4 ) The manager can voluntarily purchase an audit.
( 5 ) The audit purchase being decided, the manager should choose a less costly (C
＝0.5 yen) but low accuracy audit (＝2/3 ) or a more costly (C＝1 yen) but high
accuracy audit (＝4/5). The investment in the IC makes his purchased audit
more accurate ( the accuracy of less costly audit and that of more costly audit
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each up to ＝4/5 and ＝9/10).
( 6 ) Whether a less costly or more costly audit was chosen is announced to the inves-
tor.
( 7 ) The audit report is issued, stating whether the asset quality is low or high. An
incorrect report will be provided, only if the asset quality is actually low.
( 8 ) Each investor decides whether to buy this asset or not.
( 9 ) The investor’s payoff is immediately known. He will suffer a loss of 5 yen from
buying a low quality asset, whereas purchasing a high quality asset gives him
a reward of 5 yen.
In both investigations we set up, but the investment in the IC can improve this
probability up to . The experimentation keeps the step (2) private throughout the
2 investigations, and hence the investor can observe imperfectly in which period the man-
ager has made an effort. All he can do is to make a guess according to his payoff. As far
as the first investigation is concerned, the step (1) stays private in the market 1 and 2 and
provides baseline results to evaluate the impact of introducing the internal control audit.
Step (6) is introduced, since the disclosure of audit fees is just starting in Japan.
In the second investigation one or two steps are added and they vary across the mar-
kets. In the market 4 the next steps are added:
(10a) The investor can sue the manager for his loss, but the probability of wining is
1/2.
(11a) Whether the investor won the suit or not is announced.
In the market 5 the next step is added:
(10b) The loss of investor can leads to sanctions imposed on the manager with prob-
ability (＝1/2), if he turns out to be making no effort. Once sanctions are im-
posed, he should pay fines, namely 8 yen, to regulators.
In the market 6 the next step is added:
(10c) If the investor gains a reward of 5 yen, an extra bonus 0.5 yen is offered by him
to the manager on condition that the latter invests in the IC and purchases an
audit.
In the market 4 the investor can sue the manager for his loss, namely 5 yen, and it can
be reimbursed in each period. The probability of winning () is 1/2, which doesn’t differ,
whether the manager makes an effort or not. If the investor wins, the manager should pay
the cost of law suit (F＝3 yen), while if he loses, he should make up for himself. However,
they will never win, if the manager doesn’t purchase an audit or the audit report says that
the asset quality is low. We make the law suit fairly expensive, taking for granted the
restraint due to the cultural and economic burdens in Japan.
In the market 5 sanctions imposed on the manager are bound to continue at least in the
next period. He should pay 8 yen as fines immediately and would pay another 8 yen in the
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next periods, whenever the investor loses, regardless of whether he makes an effort or not.
These sanctions would continue with a half chance that any subsequent period is last and
with certainty as long as the manager doesn’t purchase an audit. The disappearance of
these effects is announced to the both sides. In the market 6 the investor is supposed to
pay the cost of investment in the IC, if his asset purchase is profitable.
Based on the one shot game, the following implications should not be ignored in the
second investigation. The payoff of manager’s cheating is as same in the market 4 as 5 on
the investment in the IC and the purchase of a less costly audit. It can, thereby, facilitate
a comparison between the effect of law suit and that of sanctions.
In the market 4 only the purchase of a less costly audit without an investment in the
IC makes cheating better off due to the low capacity of enhancing the asset quality
as well as high probability of incorrect audit report (1－＝1/3). Otherwise,
cheating will be worse off, because of the high capacity of improving the asset quality
as well as the low frequency of erroneous report (1－＝1/5). In the market 5
even the purchase of a less costly audit without an investment in the IC makes cheating
worse off. In the market 6, except for the purchase of a less costly audit without an invest-
ment in the IC, cheating will be always worse off.
32 The Results
In the first investigation our 3 hypotheses are:
H 1 : The frequency of effort and asset purchase increases when auditing is available.
H 2 : The frequency of investment in the IC increases when it is public.
H 3 : The frequency of effort and asset purchase increases when the investment in the
IC is public.
In the second investigation our 3 hypotheses are:
H 4 : The frequency of effort and asset purchase is higher in the market where penal-
ties are enforced by regulators than by judges.
H 5 : The frequency of effort and asset purchase is higher when an extra bonus is
offered to the manager.
H 6 : The frequency of investment in the IC is higher when the cost is likely to be paid
by the investor.
2 investigations are separately conducted and the participants are not necessarily the
same from one to another. Thus, we consider the comparison to be invalid. Table 1 shows
both the standard deviation and the average frequency of audit purchase, investment in
the IC, effort selection, and asset purchase in the first investigation. Table 2 shows the
above mentioned figures in the second investigation. The comparison and the statistical
examination are made across the 3 markets in each investigation.
As Table 3 shows, the first hypothesis receives strong support. The digression analysis
(Table 1) supports this result, showing a big improvement of coefficient between the
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frequency of effort and asset purchase, when auditing is available (market 2). The second
hypothesis receives week support, although the frequency increases significantly in the
market 2 and increases further when the investment in the IC is public (market 3), as
Figure 6 demonstrates. The results contrast sharply with our previous experimentation
(Kato 2007a), which shows a dramatic increase.
The third hypothesis receives very strong support, contrary to our previous experi-
mentation (Kato 2007a). The frequency of effort and asset purchase increases significantly
compared with the market 2, which results suggest that the IC transparency improves the
economic efficiency and could be playing a efficient role in inducing trust in the markets.
『明大商学論叢』 第 90巻第 4号12 ( 328 )
Table 1 Standard Deviation, Average, and Digression Analysis in the First Investigation
Market 1 2 3
IC Investment Private IC Investment Public
Auditing Unavailable Auditing Available
n 20 20 20
Audit Cost 0.5 1 0.5 1
Frequency of Audit Purchase
SD 6.400 8.332 8.388 8.689
Average 5.70 11.50 11.60 7.15
Frequency of Total Audit Purchase
SD 4.047 3.242
Average 17.20 18.75
Frequency of Investment in the IC
SD 4.320 6.386 7.250
Average 6.85 12.40 14.35
Frequency of Effort
SD 3.493 4.327 3.776
Average 8.10 15.25 17.55
Frequency of Asset Purchase
SD 4.082 4.635 2.375
Average 11.15 13.30 16.20
Coefficient
Selection of Effort and Asset Purchase
0.5157 0.8253 0.7792
Selection of Investment in the IC and Asset Purchase
0.2849 0.1629 0.2005
Selection of Investment in the IC and Audit Purchase
0.2533 0.2457
The results are against the fourth hypothesis. In the market 4 where penalties are
enforced by judges the frequency of effort and asset purchase is the highest. However, in
the market 5 where penalties are enforced by regulators, the frequency of effort and asset
purchase decreases, particularly the former significantly, compared with the market 4. In
addition, the frequency of investment in the IC is the lowest, as Figure 7 demonstrates.
More than a half of managers are reluctant to invest in the IC. It is worth noting that the
disadvantage of manager’s cheating or making no effort, is the same in both markets. One
difference is that some unlucky honest managers will be penalized in the market 4, while
they will never be in the market 5.
In the market 4 the investor himself can bring a law suit against the manager. The
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Table 2 Standard Deviation, Average, and Digression Analysis in the Second Investigation
Market 4 5 6
Law Suit Available Sanctions Imposed Bonus Offered
n 20 20 20
Audit Cost 0.5 1 0.5 1 0.5 1
Frequency of Audit Purchase
SD 3.523 0.821 4.656 4.707 1.226 0.813
Average 17.90 0.40 17.90 1.55 19.35 0.350
Frequency of Total Audit Purchase
SD 3.164 0.999 0.9233
Average 18.30 19.45 19.70
Frequency of Investment in the IC
SD 7.170 7.564 6.541
Average 13.60 9.45 15.45
Frequency of Effort
SD 4.616 6.653 7.685
Average 17.40 13.45 12.30
Frequency of Asset Purchase
SD 3.310 3.318 4.650
Average 15.30 13.80 13.60
Coefficient
Selection of Effort and Asset Purchase
0.7323 0.8602 0.8769
Selection of Investment in the IC and Asset Purchase
－0.0590 －0.1200 0.5684
Selection of Investment in the IC and Audit Purchase
－0.1360 －0.3766 0.3415
The Carrot and Stick Effect of Law Enforcement on the Inducement of Trust in the Markets
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Table 3 t-Test, F Test, Mann-Whitney Test, and Kruskal-Wallis Test
Frequency of Effort Asset Purchase Investment in the IC
Market 1 and Market 2
-Statistic 7.345 1.557 3.219
-Value **0.0000 0.0639 **0.0013
-Statistic 1.535 2.458 2.185
-Value 0.3587 0.0570 0.0967
Mann-Whitney Test -Statistic 4.193 2.083 2.827
-Value **0.0000 *0.0186 **0.0024
Market 2 and Market 3
-Statistic 1.791 2.490 0.9027
-Value *0.0406 **0.0086 0.1862
-Statistic 1.313 3.808 1.289
-Value 0.5587 **0.0004 0.5858
Mann-Whitney Test -Statistic 2.123 2.259 1.393
-Value *0.0169 *0.0120 0.818
Market 1, Market 2 and Market 3
Kruskal-Wallis Test Statistic 30.21 14.99 12.90
-Value **0.0000 **0.0006 **0.0016
Market 4 and Market 5
-Statistic 2.188 1.431 1.781
-Value *0.0177 0.0803 *0.0415
-Statistic 2.077 1.005 1.113
-Value 0.1197 0.9918 0.8183
Mann-Whitney Test -Statistic 1.839 1.325 1.542
-Value *0.0329 0.0925 0.0616
Market 5 and Market 6
-Statistic 0.5059 0.1566 2.683
-Value 0.3079 0.4382 **0.0054
-Statistic 1.334 1.964 1.337
-Value 0.4420 0.1504 0.5328
Mann-Whitney Test -Statistic 0.4869 0.3381 2.340
-Value 0.3132 0.6324 **0.0096
Market 4 and Market 6
-Statistic 2.544 0.3714 0.8524
-Value **0.0076 0.3562 0.1997
-Statistic 2.772 1.973 1.202
-Value 0.0077 0.1475 0.6931
Mann-Whitney Test -Statistic 2.489 1.109 0.8656
-Value **0.0064 0.1337 0.1934
Market 4, Market 5 and Market 6
Kruskal-Wallis Test Statistic 6.590 2.081 5.780
-Value *0.0371 0.3533 0.0556
significantly different at 0.05 (one tail)
significantly different at 0.01 (one tail)
number of penalties in the market 4 (13 times in total) is almost as same as in the market
5 (12 times in total including penalties during the sanctions declared periods), but the
chance of law suit (24 times in total) is twice bigger. That might make a big difference,
since the much more likelihood of penalties could remind managers of an imminent threat
against their cheating. Furthermore, most of subjects incline to be a risk taker facing with
a chance of law suit. They restrain only 2 out of 24 cases.
The results are also against the fifth and sixth hypothesis. The frequency of effort and
asset purchase is the lowest in the market 6 where an extra bonus is offered to the manager
and the cost of investment in the IC is paid by the investor. The investor’s goodwill, in
other words, the carrot can’t prevent managers from cheating, although the investment in
the IC and the coefficient with the asset purchase increase compared with other 2 markets,
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Figure 6 Frequency of Investment in the IC in the First Investigation
Figure 7 Frequency of Investment in the IC in the Second Investigation
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Figure 8 Selection of Effort over Time in the First Investigation
Figure 9 Selection of Asset Purchase over Time in the First Investigation
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Figure 10 Selection of Effort over Time in the Second Investigation
Figure 11 Selection of Asset Purchase over Time in the Second Investigation
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as Table 1 and Figure 7 show. These results suggest that the carrot without the stick
doesn’t work so as to ameliorate the efficiency of markets.
Taking a look at the selection of effort and the asset purchase over time in the first
investigation (Figure 8 and 9), the frequency of mutual defection is always much higher
when auditing is unavailable. The audit purchase could prevent it from increasing over
time. In the second investigation the mutual defection increases towards the end, when
sanctions are imposed by regulators and when an extra bonus is offered to a manager by
the investor (Figure 10 and 11).
4. Concluding Remarks
The summary of our experimental investigations is as follows.
( 1 ) Making transparent the cost of investment in the IC increases trust in the mar-
kets, which results suggest that the internal control audit should work as a
signal for manager’s honesty.
( 2 ) Law enforcement by regulators, considered to be more specialized and hence
more competent than judges, is less efficient, which results are disturbing to our
understanding in Japan. The much more likelihood of law suit could be an
efficient pressure for manager’s honesty. That reminds us of the importance of
suing without a hesitation. The sanctions imposed by regulators seem to be a
bit slow against manager’s cheating.
( 3 ) The goodwill of investors doesn’t work in order to prevent managers from
cheating. The results reassure penalties-orientated law enforcement so far.
A comparison across the two types of penalties enforcement, that of judges and that of
regulator, as well as an extra bonus offered, could give a challenging theme to our future
research perspective.
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Appendix 1
Information and Instruction of the Second Investigation
General Information
You have been given the opportunity to participate in a study. The purpose of the
study is to expand the knowledge of economic decision making. You have the opportunity
to earn the money in an experiment.
Information about the Experiment
You will now participate in an experiment. 3 laboratory markets are created. Each
seller can invest in the internal control (IC) and auditing is available throughout 3 mar-
kets. Both the investment in the IC and the audit purchase are public. In the first market
(market 4) each buyer can sue the seller for his loss. In the second market (market 5)
sanctions are likely to be imposed by regulators against seller’s cheating.
By investing in the IC at the cost of 0.5 yen, each seller makes his attempt more likely
to be fulfilled. By means of this investment, he can produce a high quality asset with
probability 1/6, but he can improve this probability up to 5/6 by making an effort at the
cost of 5 yen. Without this investment, on the other hand, he can produce the high quality
with probability 1/5, but he can improve the probability through his effort up to 4/5.
The computer always discloses that the asset quality is high. If each seller wants to be
honest, he should choose an effort. He can purchase an audit. If he purchases it, the cost
and the audit report is published at once, stating that the asset quality is low or high. The
audit report is always correct, when it states that the asset quality is low, but sometimes
an incorrect audit report will be issued, when it states that the asset quality is high.
Each seller can purchase either a less costly audit at the cost of 0.5 yen or a more costly
audit at the cost of 1 yen. If he doesn’t invest in the IC and purchases a less costly audit,
an incorrect audit report will be issued with probability 1/3, while if he doesn’t invest in it
and purchases a more costly audit, the likelihood decreases to 1/5. Meanwhile, the invest-
ment in the IC reduces the probability of incorrect report until 1/5 even on the purchase of
a less costly audit. The purchase of a more costly audit reduces it to as small as 1/10.
Each buyer has to choose a “buy” or “not buy”. The computer reveals immediately
whether he has gained or lost. If he buys a low quality asset, he will lose 5 yen, while if he
buys a high quality one, he will gain 5 yen. In the markets 4 he can sue the seller for his
loss at the cost of 3 yen. With probability 1/2 he can win and his loss and the cost of law
suit will be compensated. With probability 1/2 he will lose and put up with himself the
cost of law suit. However, he will never win, if the seller doesn’t purchase an audit or the
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audit report says that the asset quality is low.
In the market 5 the loss of each buyer can leads to sanctions imposed on the seller with
probability 1/2, if he turns out to be making no effort. Once sanctions have been imposed,
he should pay fines, namely 8 yen, to regulators. Sanctions imposed on the seller are bound
to continue at least in the next period. He should pay 8 yen as fines immediately and
would pay another 8 yen in the next period, whenever the buyer loses, regardless of
whether he makes an effort or not. These sanctions would continue with a half chance that
any subsequent period is last and with certainty as long as the seller doesn’t purchase an
audit. The disappearance of these effects is announced to the both sides.
In the market 6 each buyer should pay 0.5 yen to the seller as an extra bonus, whenever
his asset purchase is successful. This will happen, only if the seller invests in the IC and
purchases an audit.
Each seller should fill a form for scores in order to assure how much he has gained or
lost in each round, since his payoff is not revealed on the computer terminal. Every time
he invests in the IC, he should write down 0.5 in the third column. When he makes an
effort, he should write down the cost (5) in the second column. When he purchases an
audit, he should also write down the cost (0.5 or 1) in the fourth column.
Depending on whether each buyer has bought the asset or not, his payoff revealed on
the computer terminal differs from －5 or ＋5 to 0. In the former each seller should write
down 10 in the first column; the price that each buyer has paid for, while in the latter he
should write down 0. If the buyer wins a law suit in the market 4, the seller should write
down －8 outside the fifth column. In the market 5 each seller should write down －8 as
well, whenever fines are imposed. In the market 6 he should write down ＋0.5, every time
he gains an extra bonus. His total payoff in each session will be automatically calculated
and shown on the computer terminal after the last round is finished. He should confirm it.
Each session includes 20 rounds.
Finally your initial pay is fixed on how many sessions you have played, regardless of
your role; namely 800 yen a session. Your pay will increase or decrease depending on your
performance. The money you have actually gained or lost is the payoff revealed on the
computer terminal or written down on the form multiplied by 8. For example, a loss of 5
yen revealed on the computer terminal suggests that you have actually lost 40 yen.
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Form for Scores
Buy ＝10 Effort ＝ 5 IC Investment ＝0.5 Audit ＝0.5 or 1 Seller’s
Not Buy＝ 0 No Effort＝ 0 No IC Investment＝0 No Audit＝0 Payoffs
1 ― ― ― ＝
2 ― ― ― ＝
3 ― ― ― ＝
4 ― ― ― ＝
5 ― ― ― ＝
6 ― ― ― ＝
7 ― ― ― ＝
8 ― ― ― ＝
9 ― ― ― ＝
10 ― ― ― ＝
11 ― ― ― ＝
12 ― ― ― ＝
13 ― ― ― ＝
14 ― ― ― ＝
15 ― ― ― ＝
16 ― ― ― ＝
17 ― ― ― ＝
18 ― ― ― ＝
19 ― ― ― ＝
20 ― ― ― ＝
00 Name Total
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